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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 17/03/2007 Accident number: 440 
Accident time: 09:10 Accident Date: 17/09/2003 




Country: Sri Lanka 
Primary cause: Unavoidable (?) Secondary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: 19/09/2003 
ID original source: VK Name of source: Private 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: Type 72 AP blast Ground condition: bushes/scrub 
sandy 
sparse trees 
Date record created: 17/03/2007 Date  last modified: 17/03/2007 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Grid ref: 
415098/1074489 
Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: IMSMA ID: LK 68 Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
disciplinary action against victim (?) 
no independent investigation available (?) 
inadequate medical provision (?) 
inadequate communications (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
use of pick (?) 
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Accident report 
The IMSMA report (summarised) and an internal accident report were made available in 
2006. These are reproduced below, edited for anonymity (and the IMSMA report summarised 
for relevance). 
1 From IMSMA report: 
“The deminer [name excised] was carrying out manual demining drills in accordance with 
HALO Sri Lanka manual demininG SOPs for 100% excavation. He was using the axe 
hammer tool to excavate the face of his lane down to a depth of 15cm when the detonation 
occurred. The mine detonated on the left hand side of his lane as he was using the axe 
hammer.” 
Injuries: “Superficial burns to left arm; temporary loss of hearing, suspected dislocation of left 
elbow.” 
Damage to equipment: “Axe hammer metal axe head shorn off by blast”. 
 
[The picture shows the head of the “Axe hammer” broken from the handle  
and with the corner burned off by the blast.] 
“The mine detonated leaving a crater approx 50cm across and 25 cm deep.”  
The ground was recorded as soft and flat. The weather was cloudy and hot. The vegetation 
was light bush. 
 
 
[The picture above shows the sandy accident site.] 
The last QA visit had been on 28th of August 2003. 
2 
The victim was a trained deminer and medic. 
The axe hammer was “used for excavation of lane 1m wide”. 
The victim was wearing a visor and body armour. 
Comment: Damage to PPE was minimal. Only the visor showed signs of having been affected 
by the blast, with light scratch marks on the outside. This was certainly due to the lightness of 
terrain and the absence of any large rocks or stones. The head of the axe hammer was 
sheared off by the force of the explosion and propelled for approx 15 metres into a safe area, 
behind the baseline. The deminer’s body armour was unaffected by the blast.” 
2 minutes to first aid, a further 20 minutes to local hospital 10 km away. 30 minutes to final 
medical treatment facility 15 km away. 
Accident reported to national authorities at 14:45 on 17th  
 
Internal report 
2 Incident details 
On 17/09/03, at 0910hrs deminer V Sritharan detonated a Type 72 A mine in his lane, whilst 
conducting 100% excavation. No serious injuries were sustained. The Task Commander, B 
Christy gave immediate First Aid before the deminer was transported to hospital. 
3 Injuries  
• Burns to left arm (no danger of further infection) 
• Suspected fracture to left elbow (TBC by X Ray) 
• Some hearing loss in the left ear 
• Symptoms of shock (not serious) 
The Deminer is able to hold a conversation and give answers to basic questions. 
4.        Treatment 
The deminer was taken first to Chavakachcheri Hospital where medical facilities were found 
to be inadequate (No X Ray facilities and only 1 duty doctor), and then to Jaffna Teaching 
Hospital (JTH), where there was a strike in process and no doctors were available to 
administer any treatment. 
[Demining Group] demining Supervisor, a qualified GP arrived at JTH saw that there were no 
doctor's available and administered further First Aid to the deminer's left arm. He was then 
brought to HALO offices on Navalar Road, where The HALO Trust .Senior Medic gave further 
dressing treatment to the affected left arm. In his opinion there is no requirement for a 
MEDIVAC to Colombo. 
5.       Further Action 
The deminer will be taken to Annaipanthy Nursing Home, Navalar Road Nallur, for X Rays to 
the left arm, in order to investigate possible fracture of the left elbow joint 
The [Demining Group] Sri Lanka Operations Manager and the Demining Supervisor have 
carried out an accident investigation.  
6. Conclusions/Observations and Recommendations 
1.   Conclusions/Observations: 
1.1. Deminer Error: The deminer was prevented from gaining easy access to the left hand 
side of his lane by the presence of the Palmyrah tree. This made it more difficult than usual to 
excavate down to the minimum depth of 15cm as taught on [Demining Group] manual 
demining training courses and as laid down in [Demining Group] Sri Lanka Manual Demining 
Standard Operational Procedures (SOPs): SOP 4 Para 4.8. Although the crater from the 
explosion caused a large amount of disturbance to the left hand side of the lane, it was still 
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possible to feel a firm crust of soil only a few centimeters below soft sand. In contrast the right 
hand side of the lane, where access was easy for the deminer, was fully excavated in the 
normal and safe fashion. 
1.2. Minefield Supervisors: The accident was not caused by inexperience or lack of 
information on the part of more senior staff. The deminer [the Victim] has been employed as a 
manual deminer since February 2003 and has cleared many mines in the past 7 months of 
work. He was working along a clearly defined Sri Lankan Army minefield belt and knew that 
the likelihood of finding more mines was very high. The Task and Section Commanders both 
had access to Sri Lankan Army minefield records and sketch maps and had walked over the 
ground on several occasions with the maps and accompanied by the Operations Manager. 
1.3. Interference with the mine's position:  There is a possibility that the mine was disturbed 
(i.e. tilted) by the growth of the Palmyrah Tree, given the size of the tree and the year that the 
mines were laid by the SLA (1997). This could have caused the mine to tilt to one side, 
resulting in a higher chance of initiation by the hammer scraper. However the blast wave 
appears to have been straight upwards, judging by the damage to the Palmyrah tree. If the 
mine had been lying on its side, an angled blast wave would probably have been visible on 
the tree. 
1.4. Possible Methods of Initiation:  
1.4.1    The deminer's hammer scraper passed over the top of the mine and initiated it with 
the bottom corner. This is borne out to some extent by the dent on the bottom left corner and 
the blast markings on the hammer scraper head, which can be traced from the bottom left to 
the top right of the blade. 
1.4.2   The hammer struck the mine full on one side due to reasons given in para 1.3. 
1.5. Lane Placement:  Both the Section Commander and Task Commander should have 
noted the awkward positioning of the Palmyrah tree and been aware of the impediment that it 
posed to excavating evenly along the entire length of the deminer's excavation trench. Lane 
placement should have been adjusted accordingly. In this particular instance it would have 
been more appropriate to have demined 4 lanes measuring 1m wide around the tree before 
excavating up to it. This is normal practice on all [Demining Group] minefields in The Jaffna 
Peninsular and individual deminers are taught to excavate around trees and similar obstacles 
on the manual demining course. By doing so it would have kept the tree in the centre of any 
excavation lane, thereby preventing a "blind spot" on one side of the lane. 
1.6. Existing Mine Pattern:   A cleared line of mines on the southern side of the tree should 
have given sufficient warning that a mine was likely to be found where it was and the deminer 
told to proceed with sufficient care. 
1.7. Medical Facilities: Chavakachcheri District Hospital was not equipped to deal with an 
emergency of this nature. Had the injuries been more severe there is a real chance that 
medical negligence could have contributed to victim fatality. When The [Demining Group] 
Operations Manager arrived at Chavakachcheri Hospital 15 minutes after the casualty had 
arrived he was still waiting to receive treatment 
Jaffna Teaching Hospital (JTH) was experiencing strike action and similarly could not 
provide a doctor to administer any necessary treatment. Instead The [Demining Group] 
Manual Demining Supervisor (a qualified General Practitioner) had to dress the deminer's 
burns himself on arrival at JTH. The[Demining Group] Senior Medic gave further treatment in 
[Demining Group] Headquarters in Navalar Road, before the deminer was eventually taken to 
a private nursing home.  
1.8.1    Army CASE VAC facilities:  The SLA put all military flights at the disposal of [Demining 
Group], which would have been crucial in facilitating an emergency CASEVAC Operation to 
Colombo 
2.   Recommendations: 
2.1. Manual Demining SOP Ammendment: An "actions on" paragraph be inserted into 
[Demining Group] Sri Lanka manual demining SOPs detailing the requirement to work evenly 
and systematically when excavating around the base of trees. 
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2.2. Disciplinary Action to be taken against Minefield Supervisors: Both the Section 
Commander and Task Commander be given final written warnings for failure to closely 
supervise deminers under their control and allocate lanes correctly. 
2.3. Disciplinary Action to be taken against the deminer: The manual deminer 
concerned is to be given a final written warning for breach of SOPs. 
2.4. CASEVAC SOPs:  A new CASEVAC SOP should be drafted for transport of casualties to 
Colombo in case of future strike action at JTH. 
2.5. Chavakachcheri Hospital: Should not be used in the event of any future CASEVACs. 
2.6. Modifications to Hammer Scraper and excavation drill: The [Demining Group] will conduct 
trials with different length of handles and methods of excavation in order to try and guard 
against over vigorous excavation techniques on individual lanes. 
2.7. Contact with JTH:    Daily contact will be made by the Senior Medic of [Demining Group] 
with JTH, to ensure that Hospital facilities are functioning correctly. In future demining will not 
take place if there is strike action in JTH. 
2.8. Formalisation of CASEVAC Plan with SLA:  The [Demining Group] will enter into formal 
agreement with SLA over the facility of using military flights for CASEVAC purposes. 
2.9. Refresher Training:   All [Demining Group] Manual deminers will undergo re training in 
the process of excavating around trees. 
7. Key timings (summarized – spreadsheet held on record) 
09:10  Uncontrolled explosion. Deminer given treatment by Task Commander 
09:15  Ambulance departs for Chavakachcheri hospital. Driver informs Demining group office 
of accident. Operations manager leaves office for hospital after failing to contact programme 
manager by mobile phone. 
09:35 Ambulance arrive at Chavakachcheri hospital. No doctor available. 
09:57 Operations manager arrives at Chavakachcheri hospital. Victim leaves for JT Hospital. 
10:25  Operations officer arrives at accident site and conducts investigation. Ops Officer finds 
hammer head lying 15 metres from accident site. Also finds fragments of mine. Failes to 
contact Programme Manager by mobile phone. 
10:30 (Approx) Ambulance arrives at JT Hospital, finds there is a strike and no doctors are 
available. 
11:15 Ops officer contacts Programme Manager by mobile telephone 
12:30 Operations officer sends a qualified [demining group] GP by motorbike to check on the 
victim. 
13:15 [demining group] GP calls operations officer to tell of strike at JT Hospital. 
13:25 Ops Officer arrives at hospital car park to find GP treating victim’s burns in the car park. 
13:40 Programme Manager asks whether further medevac is required. Ops officer says 
injuries are not serious, based on the GP’s opinion. 
14:45 Programme Manager is told by the NSCMA secretary to cinduct the inevestigation with 
no parallel external investigation. 
16:00 Victim admitted to private nursing home for assessment. 
22:00 Ops Officer visits victim. 
[It can be seen that it took six hours and 50 minutes for the victim to get “treatment” with no 
surgical facility and no trauma specialist.]  
Victim Report 
Victim number: 587 Name: [Name removed]  
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Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: presumed 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Six hours 50 minutes 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frontal apron, Long 
visor 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES: minor Arm; minor Hearing 
COMMENT: See Medical Report. 
Medical report 
[Under Section 7, Key Timings of the accident report it can be seen that it took six hours and 
50 minutes for the victim to get “treatment” with no surgical facility and no trauma specialist.] 
[It took six hours and 50 minutes for the victim to get “treatment” with no surgical facility and 
no trauma specialist.] 
History Observation
Lost of left site hearing of ear after landmine explosive. Right site ear hearing also very poor. 
Left side arm affected. May be dislocation or Fracture in the Elbow Joint. Admitted the Patient 
to the Annnaipanthy hospital. [Name excised] (General Physician) will see the Patient by 4.00 
pm today who need to stay in the hospital for special investigation. I arranged him necessary 
Facilities. 
On my External Examination There is no any External Injury  
Thanking You. 
Signed Senior Medic 
The following details were also in the demining group’s internal report on the accident. 
Left Elbow: Patient complaining of acute pain in left elbow. X Ray did not show dislocation 
Left Ear: No hearing 
Right Ear: Hearing drastically reduced 
Burns to left Arm: Superficial 
An ENT specialist has been arranged to visit the patient at 1600 hrs 18/09/03. 
Signed: [Demining Group] Senior Medic. 18/09/03 
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Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Unavoidable” because it seems that the 
deminer may have been working appropriately to his SOPs when the initiation occurred. The 
secondary cause is listed as a “Field Control Inadequacy” because the internal investigation 
concluded that disciplinary action against the field supervisors was appropriate – because 
they did not instruct the deminer to clear around the palm tree in a different manner. 
The fact that the investigators suggested trials of variants on the tool “Axe hammer” or 
“scraper” implies that they may have recognised that it was unsafe. 
The tool has been involved in a large number of other accidents with this demining group. The 
“Axe Hammer/Scraper” used in this accident is sometimes referred to by the demining group 
as a “Trowel” or an ”Enxada”. It is actually a mattock with a handle length that varies. In many 
accidents with this tool the wooden handle shatters as it did in this accident and the tool head 
landed 15 metres away. If the head had struck the deminer it could have been fatal. See also 
accidents 15, 18, 48, 53, 313, 327, 330, 439.  
 
Statements 
Statement by Injured Deminer  
I [Name removed] was working at about 09:30 at Varany Minefield for about 2 meters in my 
demining.lane. As I was demining there was a small Palmyra tree on the left side of my lane. 
As I passed the tree for about 35 cm there was a sudden blast when my hammer scraper 
went  to the left direction. I was dazed and was surrounded with smoke and dust. My visor 
was heavily fogged. My first reaction was to see if my hand was there because it was numb. I 
could not make out what was happening around me. [Name removed] came after  some time 
and took me out on a stretcher. My arms and fingers were stinging very badly and my left ear 
was not working. Now I am unable to move my left arm and fingers due to a severe pain and 
my left is completely deaf but my right is manageable. The left side of my head hurts and I 
feel totally lost at times, like I am in amnesia. 
I think that the tree while growing was turn the mine vertically and my hammer scraper 
initiated it.  
[Name removed] Manual Demining Supervisor in Jaffna, gathered this report. 
 
Statement by Task Commander Varany Minefield 
I [Name removed] task commander went to mine field at 7.20 Am on September 17th 2003.At 
about 7.30 we started demining operations. When 3rd shift going on I was supervising 4th 
lane works all of a sudden a loud explosion heard. When I observed the huge smoke was 
observed. I also head of the section commander blowing whistle continually. I rushed to the 
place immediately at the time section commander [Name removed] and one deminer were 
with me. When I observed the lane where I head the sound the deminer [the Victim] was 
standing up. I ordered [Name removed] bring the deminer to a safe area. I examined the 
injured person and found injury on his left arm. Immediately I attended the injury with 
antiseptic send my driver to inform the incident to office over telephone available in the Varani 
at 9.20 am I took the injured person to the Chavakachcheri hospital by means of ambulance. I 
also instructor my going not to work still I got instruction from office during this time my 
operations manager came to see they made inquiries from me and went to the place where 
incident occurred. Operations manager took photographs at his instruction we came back to 
office. 
 
Statement by Section Commander Varany Minefield  
I Section Commander [Name removed] while working at Varany Navatkaddu Mine field on 
17th September 2003. To Start the 3rd Shift below the  whistle and supervised Deminer's 
Operation in each lanes. At that time my task commander [Name removed] was supervising 
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at the 4th Lane. During this process a Barbed wire had to be removed near the board 
indicating land mines. The task commander instructed me to remove the barbed wire. I was 
doing this job some where in front where the incident took place. I also heard the sound of the 
explosion. At the time lot of smoke and flames could be seen at that place. I realized an 
accident has taken place. Suddenly I ordered all deminer to vacate the place and went toward 
the sight. At the time task commander [Name removed] was beside me. 
When I observed the place where the incident took place I noted [the victim] deminer was 
standing up. Task commander [Name removed] gave instruction to my deminer to go to the 
lane where incident took place an to bring the injured person. The injured person was given 
first aid treatment by task commander. During this period I closed the lane the accident 
occurred with the help of sticks. I also kept the a Deminer at that place. On the instruction of 
the task commander I took the injured person to the Chavakachcheri hospital by ambulance. 
While we were in hospital our operations manager came to hospital from Chavakachcheri 
hospital operation manager ordered to take him to Jaffna hospital. Ambulance driver in the 
vehicle took him to hospital. Operations manager  took me and task  commander to the site 
where incident to place and took many photographs and instructed us to get back to office. 
Statement by Deminer 10 Section 
I Deminer [Name removed] working at Varany Navatkaddu Mine field on 17th September 
2003. After the interval 8.40-8.50 we started the work .A sudden explosion heard. When I saw 
smokes and flames. At the time I heard task commander's whistle sound. Suddenly I was 
close the lane and went out. When I came out I saw task commander and section commander 
was there. And I was look where incident occurred injured person [the Victim] was there. On 
the instruction of section commander I went inside the lane and carried the injured deminer.  
The injured person was given first Aid treatment by task commander. After that took the 
injured person to the Chavakachcheri hospital by Ambulance. 
 
Statement by deminer 2 - 10 Section 
I Deminer [Name removed] working at Varany Navatkaddu Mine field on 17th September 
2003. After the interval 8.40-8.50 we started the work .A sudden explosion heard. When I turn 
my head back side I saw smocks flames on [the Victim]’s lane. At the time I heard task 
commander's whistle sound. Suddenly I was close the lane and went out. When I came out I 
saw task commander, section commander and [Name removed] was there. And section 
commander went inside the lane. The injured person was given first Aid treatment by task 
commander. After that took the injured person to the Chavakachcheri hospital by Ambulance. 
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